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TITLE:  FARE, FREE, OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN? 
 
ABSTRACT 
The following synthesis offers information as to the impact, cost, advantages, and disadvantages of 
implementing system wide fare-free policies in various transit systems.  Information was gathered through 
the documented results of research done on case studies of fare-free experiments, and from active transit 
professionals with first-hand knowledge of the results of other fare-free demonstrations implemented by a 
variety of transit systems around the United States.   
 
Based upon the findings of this synthesis, it is concluded that a fare-free policy might be appropriate for 
smaller transit systems in certain communities, but is ill-advised for larger transit systems in major urban 
areas because experience shows that in larger systems, a tremendous amount of criminal activity, as well 
as a sharp increase in ridership, caused higher maintenance costs, labor costs, and operational costs and 
drove away existing riders.   
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TITLE: FARE, FREE, OR SOMETHING IN BETWEEN? 
INTRODUCTION 
From time to time, either transit policy board members or transit managers seriously consider providing 
transit services free of charge to passengers.  There are a number of factors behind the motivation to offer 
fare-free transit and there are consequences to any operational transit policy, and those who make 
decisions about whether to offer fare-free service should be aware of the range of possible consequences. 
There are many factors, which influence whether fare-free transit would be a negative or positive 
experience in any given environment such as the size of the community and transit system, degree of 
commitment to fare-free service by both the community and the transit system management and 
employees, and age and establishment of the transit service (16). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to document the advantages and disadvantages of fare-free service in 
differing transit system environments within the framework of several fundamental policy questions.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
In researching fare-free policy, a search was initiated in TRIS Online and an exhaustive search of the 
Internet was performed, searching for all demonstrations of fare-free transit and the results of 
implementation of fare-free policy. 
 
The internet was a valuable resource, but most articles pertained to decade old experiments.  The fact that there have 
not been any recent fare-free demonstrations in larger transit systems is telling:  After the disconcerting experiences 
of larger transit systems experimenting with fare-free service, most transit system directors were hesitant to try fare-
free service, instead opting for marketing to Universities and local employers for reduced fares to build ridership.  
This article focuses on the precise reasons why totally fare-free policies don’t work in large metropolitan areas.
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POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF FARE-FREE TRANSIT IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Cost Advantages of Fare-Free Service 
The implementation of a fare-free policy may eliminate revenues collected, but it also eliminates costs 
associated with setting and collecting fares (30, 31). A certain amount of overhead is associated with fare 
policy research and planning within transit organizations.  The elimination of fares could remove these 
costs and may free staff to focus on the quality and effectiveness of service, which is important in keeping 
and attracting quality ridership (33). 
 
The impact of changes in transit fares on ridership is typically assessed by fare elasticity measures (2, 6, 
10, 22).  The Simpson-Curtain Rule of fare elasticity would theoretically cause a 30 percent increase in 
ridership, with a 100 percent decrease in fares (16, 39). However, elasticity levels can vary by type of 
passenger, time of day, type of route, and length of time since the fare change was instituted (6, 22). 
 
The farebox may be seen as a potential source of confusion and embarrassment to the uninitiated transit 
user (16).  Although automobile users have costs over and above the cost of gasoline whenever they 
make a trip, they are not inconvenienced by having to search for change and remembering the confusing 
details of the transit system.  Psychologically, this has a deleterious effect on existing and potential transit 
customers (39). 
 
The types of ridership increases are also important.  Hodge et al. (1994) propose that there are two 
positive sources of ridership change that can be accomplished by fare-free implementation: 
 
• Transit riders who are attracted by the goal of decreasing auto use and fulfilling environmental 
objectives. 
• Transit riders who are provided with additional mobility. 
 
It has been found that smaller transit systems do not experience problem riders like those described in 
larger systems.  Those organizations attribute these positive results to educational efforts and an 
aggressive, zero-tolerance policy for unacceptable behavior while on board transit (16). 
 
Positive effect of Fare-Free Policies on internal transit environment 
The removal of the farebox will change the vehicle environment.   Proponents of fare-free service believe 
that removing the farebox will eliminate the problem of fare disputes and will also eliminate the abuse of 
drivers by passengers who equate fare payment with ownership of the vehicle.  Much of the transit vehicle 
driver’s job satisfaction is tied to interactions with passengers.  If the farebox is removed and transit riders 
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experience a more welcoming environment due to the removal of this potential psychological barrier, then 
the drivers will also benefit (16).   
 
Some researchers (16) feel that critics have over emphasized the negative aspects of a fare-free policy, 
because problem riders are not always an issue, educational programs may resolve these problems, the 
severity of the problem riders may vary as a function of whether the system started fare-free or if the 
system converted, and management attitudes toward the fare-free policy and the communication of these 
attitudes to other transit employees may influence the agency’s fare-free experience.   
 
System efficiency— Advantages in a fare-free system 
Traditionally, one measure of system effectiveness is the farebox recovery rate.  In support of fare-free 
service, researchers (16) state that an overemphasis on farebox recovery is counterproductive with 
respect to the goal of increasing ridership.  Instead, system effectiveness could be measured by cost per 
rider, rather than farebox recovery.  In the case of Austin, Texas, in the 12 months prior to the fare-free 
experiment, the average cost per rider was $2.51.  During the 15 months of the fare-free experiment, the 
average cost per rider was $1.51 and rose back up to an average cost per rider of $2.18 in the year 
following the fare-free experiment (5).  Researchers (16) purport that the system also gained some 
efficiencies because there were no labor and capital expenses associated with collecting fares. 
 
Community image advantages 
In current U.S. culture, public transit is most often viewed as the option of last resort.  Existing users may 
view transit differently from non-users of transit.  In many cases, automobile users view any increase in 
taxes that fund transit as being unfair to them, not realizing that society subsidizes auto travel (39).  In a 
fare-free transit system, people who usually drive may be encouraged to use public transit simply because 
it does not cost them anything more to use public transit. 
 
POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF FARE-FREE TRANSIT IMPLEMENTATION 
Cost Disadvantages of Fare-Free Service 
In larger transit systems, fareboxes generate much more of an agency’s operating revenue than smaller 
systems.  At Miami-Dade Transit, fareboxes generate $70 million per year (or 33.33 percent) of the 
approximately $210 million in operating costs (25).  Comparatively, in many smaller systems the farebox 
recovers less than ten percent of the yearly operating cost.  Removing the farebox might make fiscal 
sense in smaller systems because the costs associated with farebox collection and farebox maintenance 
may equal the fare revenue.  However, in larger transit systems, the actual cost of removing the fareboxes 
will leave the system with a very large revenue shortfall.  
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Although the Mercer County (Trenton, NJ) fare-free demonstration in 1979 was conducted only during 
non-peak hours, their system sustained a loss in peak hour fares as well.  A total of one-fourth (24.7 
percent) of their revenue was lost from the fare-free experiment, with 4.3 percent of that loss coming from 
fare revenue lost during peak transit hours.  Additionally, Mercer Metro had to provide additional bus 
service to meet excessively high passenger demands during the fare-free hours, causing operation costs 
to skyrocket (9). 
 
The Capital Metro fare-free experience in Austin, Texas mirrors the Mercer Metro results.  The system 
quickly became overburdened with requirements for capacity expansion and a subsequent increase of 
operating costs. The skyrocketing operation and maintenance costs became a substantial drain on the 
system.  Officials at Capital Metro described the cost of operation in a fare-free system as “staggering” 
(29). 
 
Negative effect on internal transit environment 
Fare-free systems can attract problem riders, resulting in vandalism and problems for other riders.  The 
Miami Beach Transportation Management Association sponsors electric shuttle bus service in Miami 
Beach.  For the first year of operations, the service was offered for free.  This new service attracted over a 
million riders in its first year, with only seven buses in operation.  However, the free fares also attracted 
undesirable passengers.  
 
The absence of fares can make riders feel a lack of responsibility for the well being of the transit system, 
also resulting in a negative impact on driver satisfaction.  In the Trenton, New Jersey fare-free experiment, 
92 percent of transit drivers found their jobs to be less enjoyable as a result of the fare-free program (9).  
In the Austin, Texas experiment, officials claim that transit operators came close to “insurrection” as their 
transit system became flooded with truant school children, vagrants, and other “dubious categories” of 
passengers (29).  It is important to note that these findings contradict the findings by Hodge et al. (16) that 
eliminating the fare would result in a more positive environment for transit vehicle operators because they 
wouldn’t have to argue with passengers over fares.  However, the psychological barrier of the farebox and 
hunting for change and dealing with paper transfers could be minimized with new fare structures (e.g., an 
all-day pass) or new farebox technology, which would eliminate transfers and accept stored-value cards or 
even credit cards.  
 
However, psychological costs in personal security and physical crowding seen in these fare-free 
demonstrations may actually cause more problems than the psychological cost of the farebox.  Problem 
riders increase personal security costs of transit use and cause a decrease in ridership of both new and 
existing quality riders (16). As evidenced in the Austin experiment, quality riders do not immediately return 
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to the system once they’ve been driven out, and the system must prove itself over time to disenfranchised 
riders (29). Steiner and Starling (32) claim that eliminating the farebox may cause a decrease in average 
boarding times, but it will cause an increase in aggregate boarding times.  The reality is that increased 
ridership will result in more crowding, which will negatively impact boarding times.  Additionally, schedule 
adherence will be negatively impacted by a larger number of people riding the bus short distances who 
might have otherwise walked (32).   
 
As mentioned previously, the transit industry standard for measuring increase in ridership is fare elasticity 
(16). However, elasticity estimates do not take into account the impact that system-wide fare-free 
implementation can have on encouraging problem riders and what ramifications that might have on long-
term riders. A farebox may be seen as a psychological barrier to the new transit user, but it may also be a 
barrier in keeping out a less desirable type of transit rider.  According to Hodge et al.(16), there are two 
negative sources of ridership change, which can possibly overwhelm a system and drive away quality 
ridership: 
 
• Transit riders who would have used other modes, but choose transit because it is free 
• Transit riders who enter the system for the negative and criminal purposes. 
 
In the Austin, Texas fare-free demonstration, both anecdotal and official data suggest that problem riders 
increased substantially and drove away other riders. In both the Mercer Metro and the Austin, Texas 
experiences, problem riders actually drove away many of the regular bus commuters.  In none of the 
experiments did the increase in transit ridership include automobile commuters enticed by the fare-free 
service (9, 20, 29). 
 
System efficiency— Disadvantages in a fare-free system 
System effectiveness can be measured by the farebox recovery rate.  Fare-free advocates suggest that 
system effectiveness could instead be measured by per rider cost.  In another example, consider a fairly 
large transit system that moved approximately 270,000 riders per day.  If that system experienced a 30 
percent increase in ridership due to fare-free program implementation, it would have an increase of 
approximately 81,000 riders per day, based on fare elasticity analysis.  A caveat here:  As the fare 
approaches zero, there may be changes around zero which are not accounted for by the Simpson-Curtain 
rule of fare elasticity.  Based upon the information from both Mercer Metro (Trenton, New Jersey) and 
Capital Metro (Austin, Texas), most transit systems could not recover from such a loss of revenue, even if 
the system might be regarded as more efficient on a cost-per-passenger basis.  Imagine that the system 
becomes overwhelmed with passengers, and must provide expansion of service.  Also imagine that the 
system must now pay for maintaining the system in the face of vandalism and property damage from 
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problem passengers, as well as hiring off-duty police officers to control security incidents.  Without 
passenger-generated revenues, most transit systems would be unable to pay for additional services and 
quality of service will suffer. 
 
Community image disadvantages 
If fare-free transit is implemented and the system becomes inundated with problem riders, vandalism, and 
personal crimes, the system will be viewed negatively and quality riders will not be attracted to it.  In trying 
to remove barriers that separate the transit-dependent rider from the quality rider, such as removing the 
farebox, the transit system may instead have unwittingly erected other barriers which are far more 
damaging to the image of the system.  Problem riders who may be encouraged into the system by a fare-
free policy may damage the system’s public image, as well as damage the system physically and 
financially.  Given these very serious repercussions, care must be taken in assessing if fare-free policies 
would be beneficial or detrimental to a particular system and community. 
 
CASE STUDIES 
Temporary Fare-Free Experiments 
Two of the largest fare-free demonstrations were conducted in the late 1970s in Trenton, New Jersey and 
Denver, Colorado.  Both projects lasted slightly more than one year between 1978 and 1979, and were 
implemented on an off-peak basis.  In Trenton, the primary motivation for the experiment was social and 
economic redevelopment of the area.  In Denver, the primary motivation for the experiment was reducing 
pollution and automobile use (16). The Denver experiment resulted in a 36 percent increase in ridership 
and the Trenton experiment resulted in a 16 percent increase in ridership (11).   
 
Many fare-free advocates express concern with the methodology of these two experiments, the first being 
that both experiments were run during off-peak hours only.  If the motivation was to promote transit use 
and reduce congestion, then perhaps the experiments should have been run during peak periods (16). 
 
A medium-sized transit system that experimented with total fare-free service was Austin, Texas.  The 
experiment ran from October 1989 to December 1990.  Ridership increased 75 percent during the 
experiment, but expanded service accounts for some of this percentage (5), and the People for Modern 
Transit (PMT) Technical Committee (29) claims that once the ridership increase is adjusted for normal 
growth and addition of University of Texas student passengers, the initial jump really only amounted to a 
10 percent increase. This experiment was regarded as both successful in terms of increasing ridership 
and disastrous in terms of attracting problem riders who drive away quality ridership and caused system 
losses due to criminal activity (29).  In response, 75 percent of transit drivers petitioned to have the fare-
free program discontinued immediately, due to the abuse they were experiencing at the hands of problem 
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riders (20). 
 
When summing up the experience of these fare-free demonstrations: 
 
• All systems showed a substantial ridership increase (ranging from 13% to 83%)(16); 
• There is little evidence that these projects made a significant dent in Single Occupant Vehicle 
travel during peak hours (5, 28, 33); 
• While the community at large supported fare-free policies, actual riders complained about 
deterioration of safety and service quality; 
• Bus operators voiced concerns over increased rowdiness, problem passengers, and the effect on 
schedules  (20, 39). 
 
PERMANENT FARE-FREE TRANSIT SYSTEMS 
The oldest fare-free system is located in Commerce, California, just outside of Los Angeles.  This system 
has operated fare-free since 1962.  According to the manager of this system, they do not experience 
problems with riders other than occasional graffiti (16).  However, this is a very small system, serving 
approximately 970,000 riders annually with 11 buses.  Although this system is located only six miles 
outside of Los Angeles, transit officials tell us that since they have such a limited travel area, they do not 
attract problem riders (8). 
 
The next oldest system is located in Amherst, Massachusetts and has been providing fare-free service 
since 1976.  The Amherst, Massachusetts system is free to all, but is partially funded by a yearly student 
fees.   This system serves five colleges in the area and also the surrounding communities.  It serves 
approximately 6 million passengers every year and operates approximately 40 buses (37).  This type of 
service is in place at many universities throughout the country, and seems to be relatively problem-free. 
 
Island County Transit, located in Washington State, has operated a fare-free system since its inception in 
1987.  According to Director Martha Rose, Island County Transit has a low occurrence of problem 
passengers.  It has 16 fixed-route buses and 2 paratransit buses.  They serve 675,775 passengers per 
year on their fixed-route service and 19,664 passengers annually on their paratransit routes (18).  Rose 
attributes their success with a three-strikes policy and also to educational programs in the schools.  The 
only complaints noted for this system were the need for more park and ride lots and buses to deal with 
increasing ridership demands.   
 
It is important to note that all of the permanent fare-free systems listed above started out as fare-free 
systems and are either small systems, or serve limited populations (e.g., UMass serves a community with 
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five colleges).  In addition, all of the successful fare-free systems shown in this synthesis serve small cities 
or rural areas. 
 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to assess if a fare-free policy would benefit a transit system, there are several questions that must 
be addressed: 
• What is the net cost of a fare free policy? 
In smaller systems, the net farebox recovery is usually less than ten percent (14).  The 
cost of collection might cancel out any net proceeds of fare collection.  Most systems 
operating in smaller communities do not experience the same types of problem riders 
experienced in larger, more metropolitan areas.   
 
In larger systems, the net farebox recovery is typically much greater than smaller 
systems, and the revenue is a substantial portion of the operating budget.  As evidenced 
by the Capital Metro fare-free experiment in Austin, Texas, which only had a 15 percent 
farebox recovery, the ballooning costs of operations due to maintenance, labor, and 
security costs financially threatened the well being of the system.  The cost of the 
deterioration of the internal bus environment, security, employee satisfaction, and public 
image was definitely not worth any benefits that could be gained by farefree (20, 29).  
 
• What will be the impact of a fare-free policy on ridership and quality of service? 
Fare-free policy will yield substantial gains in ridership.  What is important is the type of 
ridership that is being gained.  Will the types of people attracted to the system be positive 
or negative for the system?  Will the implementation of fare-free service overwhelm the 
system with overcrowding and problem riders, driving away existing users?   
 
• How will a fare-free policy impact the attainment of the community’s goals? 
Will fare-free service increase mobility for transit-dependent riders in the community?  Will 
fare-free service advance environmental and traffic congestion goals?  Will fare-free 
service cause a positive perception of the transit system in the long term?  Will fare-free 
service cause an increase or decrease in customer service and satisfaction?  (16) 
 
It seems that fare-free service in certain communities with smaller transit systems can be a positive 
experience, as evidenced by long-running fare-free services in systems such as Commerce, California; 
Amherst, Massachusetts; and Island County Transit in Washington.  However, the experience with fare-
free service in large urban areas has not been successful in terms of overall service quality.  Fare-free 
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proponents question the methodology within these fare-free demonstrations: two of the larger systems 
discussed in this report (Denver and Trenton) offered the fare-free service during peak transit hours only. 
It is not clear if more ridership might have been attracted during peak hours.  It could be that off-peak 
times actually attract more problem riders, while not assisting in the attainment goals such as promoting 
transit use, increasing mobility, and reducing traffic congestion and pollution. 
 
In the case of Austin, Texas, fare-free service was provided all day, and there were no time limits set on 
the demonstration.  Although significant efforts were made to increase passenger safety and comfort 
through hiring off-duty police officers, Hodge et al. (16) claim that many of the Austin demonstration’s 
problems stemmed from lack of support for the policy from agency managers and lack of planning and 
scheduling for overload on specific routes.  Many others point to the fact that a fare-free policy simply 
overwhelms the system, significantly increasing operating costs. The fare-free experiment did not increase 
quality ridership or improve the public image of the system and problem riders were attracted to the 
system, and vandalism and crime increased (29).  Physical assaults tripled in the first three months of the 
fare-free implementation, increasing to 120 incidences from 44 in the three months prior to implementation 
(3).  Many faithful riders were driven from the system by fear for personal safety and the deterioration of 
the bus environment and they were not quick to return after the experiment (20, 29). 
 
Fare-free proponents (16), who espouse the benefits of fare-free policy stop short of recommending fare-
free implementation for larger systems.  They instead advocate achieving better system efficiency and 
quality ridership via marketing of prepaid fares.  If a transit system is trying to attract a certain type of rider 
with the incentive of fare-free service, why not market the fare-free service directly to that population?  A 
transit system might market passes to surrounding businesses and universities on a prepaid basis.  
Prepaid fare marketing to choice rider populations would seem to be a more efficient way of increasing 
choice ridership, increasing mobility, and decreasing traffic congestion and pollution.  Issues such as 
safety, travel time, frequency and reliability of service, availability and ease of schedule and route 
information, infrastructure at stops, and driver courtesy, were all found to be more important than the cost 
of fares (39).   
 
In a study performed in the Spring of 1990, during the fare-free demonstration period, Capital Metro (5) 
asked both riders and the general public for the five most important factors in determining 
whether to ride the bus.  The five most important factors were:  
 
• On-board safety 
• On-time performance 
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• Convenience of routes 
• Cleanliness inside the buses 
• Frequency of service (5). 
 
The three least important factors in determining if both riders and the general public would ride 
the bus were: 
 
• Cost of service; 
• Outside appearance of the buses; 
• Courtesy of the bus operators (20). 
 
Transit systems desiring to increase choice ridership should instead focus on improving service 
quality and safety for customers.  Even a minimum fare offers a barrier to problem riders that 
cause a deterioration in the service, image, and comfort of a given transit system (6,39). 
  
NEW DIRECTIONS 
There are many unanswered questions in the presented research review.  Are fare-free 
demonstrations really a bad idea?  Or, has the proper research not yet been done?  There have 
been many research projects into increasing ridership by marketing to certain demographics via 
schools or employers. There are successful U-PASS programs, which offer unlimited transit 
service to students in many other University communities (4, 24, 35, 38).  While these programs 
are not fare-free in the truest sense, they allow students, staff, and faculty a complete package 
of transportation benefits for a very low price, while building ridership on the transit system.  In 
fact, in the Chicago area, the U-PASS program accounts for one-sixth of the Chicago Transit 
Authority’s (CTA) ridership (35). 
 
There are questions that linger here that need to be addressed.  Can the results of any of the 
urban transportation fare-free demonstrations be trusted? Did the fare-free experiments fail 
because fare-free doesn’t work in larger systems, or did it fail because staff members of larger 
transit systems had negative feelings about the demonstration?  Elimination of fares has been 
theorized to help increase transit system efficiency by reducing the cost of fare collection (30, 
31).    For fairness, future directions in fare-free demonstrations in larger urban settings should 
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include better controls of the attitudes of staff and directors in those systems.  It is possible that 
predetermined attitudes contributed to the failure of fare-free demonstrations in larger transit 
systems.  Future studies should include comprehensive studies of farebox recovery in smaller 
versus larger systems and which amenities are most important to riders.   
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